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Abstract
 
We propose a new methodology for obtaining a 
quantitative measurement of the risk reduction 
achieved when a control system is modified with the 
intent to improve cyber security defense against 
external attackers. The proposed methodology 
employs a directed graph called a compromise graph, 
where the nodes represent stages of a potential attack 
and the edges represent the expected time-to-
compromise for differing attacker skill levels. Time-
to-compromise is modeled as a function of known 
vulnerabilities and attacker skill level. The 
methodology was used to calculate risk reduction 
estimates for a specific SCADA system and for a 
specific set of control system security remedial 
actions. Despite an 86% reduction in the total number 
of vulnerabilities, the estimated time-to-compromise 
was increased only by about 3 to 30% depending on 
target and attacker skill level. 
 
. 
1. Introduction 
 
Control systems connected to public networks are 
at risk from cyber attack. Operators of these control 
systems need a measure of the risk associated with 
potential attacks if they are to effectively manage their 
resources. Cyber security evaluations are traditionally 
qualitative in nature such that recommendations are 
given for remedial actions with no quantitative 
measure of how the recommended actions reduce the 
risk of a successful attack. 
In April 2005 our risk analysis team was asked to 
perform a quantitative estimate of the risk reduction 
on a partial Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system referred to as CS60. The baseline 
system had already undergone a security review, been 
modified to enhance security, and then been retested; 
consequently, there was no opportunity to devise or 
execute any tests tailored for risk reduction estimation 
needs. The analysis was undertaken with the following 
goals in mind: 
• The first goal was to find or create a suitable 
methodology for a quantitative risk reduction 
estimation of a specific SCADA control 
system. It needed to produce quantified 
estimates, believable to the customer and 
ourselves that were superior to the general 
qualitative assessments already made. It also 
needed to be defined well enough to provide a 
framework for discussion and improvement 
with a variety of personnel. 
• The second goal was to apply the agreed-upon 
methodology to the CS60 system and assess 
the risk reduction accomplished by the 
security enhancements that had been applied 
as a result of the first security review.  
• The third goal was to show that analysts and 
hackers could be integrated in such a way that 
the methodology could be executed efficiently 
and with an appropriate amount of give and 
take between group members with vastly 
different skills and interests.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
Researchers are testing the viability of different 
approaches for dealing with control system cyber 
security. Carlson et al. [3] describes a novel approach 
for applying Hidden Markov Models to an 
attack/defend scenario on an infrastructure system. 
The approach, based on sound statistical models, is 
flexible, but requires both detailed information about 
the system and significant set-up time. Madan et al. 
[6] apply a stochastic model to computer network 
system. It is used to determine steady-state availability 
of QoS attributes and also mean times to security 
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failures based on probabilities of failure due to 
violations of different security attributes. The theory 
used is classic statistical stochastic modeling. 
Employing this type of model requires knowledge of 
the system in detail. Furthermore, Haimes [5] applied 
Hierarchical Holographic Models, event trees, and 
fault trees to a variety of applications, both models 
require specific details, are not dynamic, and rely on 
expert opinion. 
Major [7] doesn’t directly address cyber security, 
but instead, develops a simplified model for 
quantifying the risk to facilities from terrorist attacks. 
The focus of the work is on physical attacks. Initially 
the model calculates the probability of an attack 
escaping detection and the probability of the attack 
being successfully executed if not detected. These two 
probabilities are hypothesized to be dependent on the 
value of the facility, and both the attackers and 
defenders resources. The model then makes use of 
game theory to determine the probability of attack on 
a facility, which based on simplifying assumptions, is 
proportional to the square root of the facilities value. 
A mapping of the proposed physical model 
quantitative estimation to cyber security was not 
proposed and isn’t obvious.  
Taylor et al. [12] provide an interesting cyber 
security assessment process that combines techniques 
from Survivability System Analysis and Probability 
Risk Assessment. The proposed process has some 
significant advantages, but seems more suitable to 
complete and operational systems so that costs, attack 
scenarios, and critical system objectives may be fully 
explored. Further, the process is dependent on 
multiple iterations of expert elicitation, which are not 
available in many situations.  
Dacier et al. [4] suggested the use of ‘privilege 
graphs’ to analyze security. Privilege graphs require 
modeling of vulnerabilities at a very low level, and, 
for a nontrivial sized system, would involve a graph of 
unmanageable size. Privilege graphs are transformed 
into Markov chains. But the assumptions underlying 
Markov chains are not necessarily applicable to an 
intelligent adversary. 
Sheyner et al. [11] describe an automated 
technique for generating and analyzing attack graphs. 
They use a model checker as the core engine to 
comprehensively generate every attack path sequence 
that could lead to an undesired system state. They 
have developed a suite of tools to aid the process and 
suggested a technique for weighting transitions of the 
attack graph as part of a post processing analyzer. The 
tool suite was not immediately available for use. 
There is a question of scalability in using a model 
checker to generate the attack paths, and the level of 
attack and vulnerability abstraction may be at a lower 
level than optimal for an estimate of risk reduction.  
Byres et al. [2] describe how the attack tree 
methodology may be applied to the common SCADA 
protocol MODBUS/TCP with the goal of identifying 
security vulnerabilities inherent in the specification 
and in typical deployments. Attack trees are a 
promising technology for aiding control system 
security analysts in the understanding and protection 
of their systems.  
While a number of the above methods and 
techniques seem promising and merit future research, 
none could provide a quantitative measure of risk 
reduction for our case study. 
 
3. Methodology Description 
 
The proposed methodology is based on the 
assumption that risk is related to the elapsed time 
required for a successful attack. This methodology is 
briefly described by the following steps:  
 
Step 1. Establish the system configuration. 
 
Step 2. Identify applicable portions of the 
quantitative risk model. 
 
Step 3. Identify and prioritize the security 
requirements of the primary target(s).  
 
Step 4. Identify system vulnerabilities. 
 
Step 5. Categorize vulnerabilities on each device 
by compromise type.  
 
Step 6. Estimate time-to-compromise each device. 
 
Step 7. Generate compromise graph(s) and attack 
paths. 
 
Step 8. Estimate dominant attack path(s). 
 
Step 9. Do Steps 3–8 for baseline and enhanced 
system. 
 
Step 10. Estimate risk reduction. 
 
The remainder of this section describes each step in 
more detail. 
 
3.1. Step 1. Establish the system configuration 
 
A control system typically consists of many 
interconnected computers customized and configured 
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to meet the requirements of a particular control 
process. The security of the system is highly 
dependent on the system configuration. The 
configuration determines the system perimeter and the 
potential attack targets. A primary target is defined as 
any control system device that can directly trigger a 
physical event, and a perimeter device as any device 
that is both part of the control system and can be 
directly reached with no routing, switching, 
forwarding, or inspection. A primary goal of system 
configuration analysis is the identification of primary 
targets and perimeter devices. 
 
3.2. Step 2. Identify applicable portions of the 
quantitative risk model 
 
The quantitative risk model used to define risk as 
the product of probability and consequence is  
R
e
 = P
e
 * C
e
 
where R
e
 is the risk of an unwanted event, P
e
 is the 
probability of occurrence of the event, and C
e
 is the 
value of the consequence of the event typically 
measured in dollars. 
 
3.2.1. Previous Decompositions of P
e.
 A variety of 
decompositions of P
e
 have been suggested in the 
literature [1,7,9]. 
Rinaldi [9] developed a partitioning of P
e
 that sets 
P
e
 = PA * (1-PE), where PA is the probability of an 
attack and (1-PE) is the probability of adversary 
success. Rinaldi further decomposes (1-PE) into the 
probability of the attack being interrupted and the 
probability of the attacker success being neutralized. 
Unfortunately, the meaning of the terms in this 
decomposition of (1-PE) is not clear, making it 
difficult to assess how one would measure or estimate 
their values.  
Beitel et al. [1] set the initial decomposition 
identically to Rinaldi, where P
e
 = PA * (1-PE), PA is the 
probability of an attack, and (1-PE) is the probability 
of adversary success. They then make the assumption 
that adversaries are like managers of multinational 
corporations who make rational choices investments 
and expected returns. They go on to define investment 
and return measures and use a modified Balanced 
Scorecard Method to calculate probability of attack. 
The parameters of the underlying factor model are 
subjectively derived based on expert’s knowledge of 
adversary goals and value systems. 
Major’s model [7] for decomposition of P
e
 sets P
e
 
= PA * PND * PSE, where PA is the probability of being 
attacked by the adversary, PND is the probability that 
the attack goes undetected, and PSE is the probability 
that an undetected attack is successfully executed. 
Major worked with physical attack in mind; cyber 
attacks raise new issues, though the thought process is 
instructive. Some necessary changes in this model 
include the assumption: if an attack is detected it will 
be defeated and the consequence will not be 
generated. This assumption may be reasonable for a 
physical attack, but it is not justified for a cyber attack 
because, even if the attack is detected, the cyber attack 
may have proceeded to successful completion before 
mitigating measures could be taken.  
 
3.2.2. New Decomposition of P
e.
 The above 
discussion and evaluation led us to a new 
decomposition that is specifically tailored for control 
systems, retains a focus on the intelligent adversary, 
and has intuitive meaning for the analysts, testers, and 
control system users. The following decomposition 
will be used as the foundation of the risk model used 
in risk reduction estimation work: 
P
e
 = Pt * Pa * Pb * Ps * Pc   
In this decomposition, P
e
 is expressed as a product 
of conditional probabilities where  
Pt = probability the system is on an attacker target 
list 
P
a
 = probability of being attacked given that the 
system is targeted 
Pb = probability of a perimeter breach given that 
the system was attacked 
P
s
 = probability of a successful attack given that 
there was a perimeter breach 
P
c
 = probability of damage given the system was 
successfully attacked. 
The decomposition is clear, reasonably intuitive, 
and sufficiently well-defined to guide the analysis of 
the proposed method for reduction estimations on 
SCADA systems. Estimating these probabilities for a 
site is rather difficult. For example, the probability of 
a successful attack against a specific site is dependent 
on the security posture and potential consequences at 
other sites, the resources available and the 
consequence preference function of each attacker 
group, and a slew of intra-site technical and 
management details. Fortunately risk reduction 
estimates can be made without estimating absolute 
values for every component of R
e
.  
For our case study SCADA system, the security 
enhancements may affect Pb and Ps but have no affect 
on the other risk components. Total risk reduction is 
therefore estimated by estimating the relative change 
in Pb and Ps. 
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3.3. Step 3. Identify and prioritize the security 
requirements of the primary target(s) 
 
The security requirements of a networked system 
determine the definition of a successful attack and are 
generally concerned with the attributes of Availability, 
Integrity, and Confidentiality. For a SCADA system, 
Confidentiality is of secondary importance while 
Integrity of the control signals and the Availability of 
the system are considered to be the highest priority 
attributes. Therefore SCADA system attacks of 
greatest interest are "Unauthorized Control" and 
"Denial of Service". 
 
3.4. Step 4. Identify System Vulnerabilities 
 
Tools that test for cyber security vulnerabilities are 
available in many varieties from commercial and free 
sources. The known vulnerabilities associated with 
each component of the system should be identified by 
testing and by a search of the vulnerability 
identification libraries such as Bugtraq 
(http://www.securityfocus.com), MITRE’s Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) 
(http://www.cve.mitre.org), and ICAT 
(http://icat.nist.gov/icat.cfm). The vulnerability 
identification libraries contain information about the 
publicly known vulnerabilities. There may be other 
vulnerabilities associated with the system that are not 
included in the public libraries. For example, there 
may be a vulnerability that is unique to control 
systems, whereas the libraries are oriented to generic 
IT vulnerabilities. The identification of vulnerabilities 
that are not in the public libraries will require expert 
knowledge of the system and its configuration. 
 
3.5. Step 5. Categorize Vulnerabilities on 
Each Device by Compromise Type 
 
After the vulnerabilities associated with a given 
machine have been identified, the plan is to categorize 
them according to compromise type so that the set of 
vulnerabilities associated with each edge of the 
compromise graphs (see Step 7) can be determined. A 
compromise graph is a directed graph where each 
node represents a potential attack state. Each node of 
the graph is one of the following types. 
1. Start – In this state, nothing is known yet about 
the details of the target system. This is the 
single entry node of the graph. 
2. Launch – Enough data has been collected to 
begin to develop an exploit or use a known 
exploit. There is one node of this type for each 
potential attack entry point on the perimeter. 
3. User_privilege – This state applies to a 
particular machine; when the attack is in this 
state the attacker has gained user level privilege 
on that machine. There is one state of this type 
for every machine in the target system. 
4. Root_privilege – This state applies to a 
particular machine; when the attack is in this 
state the attacker has gained root/admin level 
privilege on that machine. There is one state of 
this type for every machine in the target system.  
5. Target_node – Any condition where the attack 
has succeeded. 
The edges of the compromise graph represent a 
transition from one attack state to another; each 
transition represents a successful compromise. The 
value of each edge is an estimate of the time required 
to make the transition, which is related to the 
difficulty of exploiting the vulnerabilities associated 
with that edge. The transition time is a function of the 
existing vulnerabilities and the attacker skill level. 
The inverse of the edge value is roughly related to the 
likelihood that the transition will occur. Figure 1 is an 
example of a partial compromise graph and applies to 
our case study (See section 4). It is a partial graph 
because it does not include values for each edge, it 
does not show all inter-node edges and does not show 
all target nodes. 
Each vulnerability is categorized into one or more 
of the following edge types. 
1. Type R (Reconnaissance)  
2. Type B (Breach) represents edges starting 
from a launch node. 
3. Type P (Penetrate) represents edges 
starting from a user or root permission 
node and end on the same type of node,. 
4.  Type E (Escalation) represents an 
escalation of permissions on the same 
machine.  
5. Type D (Damage) represents the 
transition to a target node. 
A vulnerability is classified as the specified type 
for machine x if it can be exploited to realize that type 
of compromise on machine x.  
3.6. Step 6. Estimate Time to Compromise 
Each Device 
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The time-to-compromise (T) is defined as the time 
needed for an attacker to gain some level of privilege 
on some system device. T depends on the nature of 
the vulnerabilities and the attacker skill level. The 
value of time-to-compromise is modeled as a random 
process that combines the following three 
subprocesses:  
Process 1 is for the case where at least one 
vulnerability is known, and the attacker has at least 
one exploit readily available that can be successfully 
used against one of the known vulnerabilities. 
Process 2 is for the case where at least one 
vulnerability is known, but the attacker does not have 
an exploit readily available that can be successfully 
used against one of the known vulnerabilities. 
Process 3 is the identification of new vulnerabilities 
and exploits. Process 3 is a parallel process constantly 
running in the background. The attacker of a 
particular system may use the results of process 3 or 
may be part of process 3. That is, the attacker may 
wait for new vulnerabilities/exploits to be identified or 
probe for new ones. 
 
Each of these processes has a different probability 
distribution. Process 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. 
Process 3 is ongoing and in parallel with the other two 
processes. 
The statistical properties of the above three 
processes are difficult to fully characterize and 
validate, however, in previous work [8] we proposed 
specific process model parameters based on the 
available data and current literature that yields the 
following formula. 
 
T = t1P1 +  t2(1-P1)(1-u) + t3u(1-P1) 
where 
T is the expected value of time-to-compromise 
t1 is the expected value of Process 1 (1 day) 
t2 is the expected value of Process 2 (5.8 ET ) 
t3 = ((V/AM) - 0.5) 30.42 + 5.8 Ł the expected value 
of process 3 
u = (1 – (AM/V))V Ł probability that Process 2 is 
unsuccessful ( u=1 if V=0) 
V is number of vulnerabilities 
P1 = 1 - e
-Vm/k
 
m = number of exploits readily available to the 
attacker, and k is total number of vulnerabilities 
in the CVE database. 
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AM is the average number of the vulnerabilities for 
which an exploit can be found or created by the 
attacker given their skill level  
NM is the number of vulnerabilities that this skill 
level of attacker won’t be able to use (V-AM) 
 
Figure 1. Partial compromise graph for CS60 system
Legend (type of compromise):
R Reconnaissance
B Breach Perimeter
P Penetrate
E Escalate
D Damage
START LAUNCH
user_OC
user_DAS
root_DAS
user_HIST
RTU_CONTROL
user_PRT
R,1
E
user_DEVW
user_APPS
user_AD
user_ICCP
root_ICCP
root_AD
root_APPS
root_DEVW
root_OC
root_HIST
root_PRT
B,2.9
P,3
D,2
Example Shortest Path: 
1+ 2.9 +2 = 5.9 
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2006
5
3.7. Step 7. Generate compromise graph(s) 
and attack paths 
 
As discussed above, a compromise graph is a 
directed graph where each node represents a potential 
attack state and each edge represents a successful 
compromise. The value of each edge is an estimate of 
the time required to make the transition and is related 
to the difficulty of exploiting the vulnerabilities 
associated with that edge. The values of the edges that 
terminate on a privilege node can be estimated by the 
method described in [8] using the number of 
vulnerabilities applicable to that particular type of 
compromise. 
 
Table 1. Compromise graph compared to well known 
hacker methodology. 
Action step Description 
Compromise 
graph mapping 
Footprint Casing the 
establishment 
Scan Look for open or 
unlocked doors 
Enumerate High level of 
intrusiveness 
information 
gathering 
‘Reconnaissance’ 
Transition from start 
state to a launch state 
Penetrate Authenticate to 
remote machine. 
Gain a foothold. 
‘breach.’ Transition 
from a launch state 
to a user_privilege or 
root_privilege state. 
Or ‘penetrate’ a 
different machine on 
the control system by 
transition to 
user_privilege or 
root_privilege on that 
other machine. 
Escalate Obtain super user 
privileges on the 
penetrated machine. 
‘escalate.’ Transition 
from a user_privilege 
to a root_privilege 
state on the same 
machine.  
Get interactive Gain the ability to 
view and control the 
internal functions of 
the machine at will. 
Pillage Do whatever 
damage desired. 
Expand 
influence 
Use the current 
position to launch 
other attacks. 
‘damage.’ Transition 
from a user_privilege 
or a root_privilege 
state to a 
target_node. 
Cleanup Install backdoors 
and erase evidence 
of entry. 
Neglected by 
compromise graph 
3.8. Step 8. Estimate dominant attack path(s) 
 
The dominant attack path for each case was chosen 
to be the path with minimum value because minimum 
time-to-compromise implies maximum risk. For the 
model chosen, the minimum path for every case goes 
through the machine with the highest number of 
vulnerabilities.  
The compromise graph is a model of a cyber attack 
where each edge is a transition that moves the attacker 
one step closer to success. Any sequence of edges that 
begins at the start node and ends at a target node is an 
attack path. Compromise graphs can be used to 
estimate the reduction in probability of a successful 
attack by comparing the minimum path of the baseline 
system to the minimum path of the enhanced system. 
Figure 1 is a partial compromise graph for the CS60 
system where an example attack path is shown in bold 
arrows. 
Consider the question of whether our binary model 
of attacker privilege has sufficient granularity. A 
binary privilege model applies for the following attack 
model. The attacker gains the desired level of access 
by entering at root level or at some low level of 
privilege and then escalates to root level. From root 
level, all other privileges can be gained. It is possible 
for an attacker to escalate to some intermediate level 
of privilege that leads to a target node without ever 
gaining root privilege. If that type of scenario is viable 
and if the probability of occurrence is significant, then 
the privilege level will need to be modeled explicitly. 
Modeling of every privilege level on every machine 
will probably lead to a model of unmanageable size.  
Table 1 is a comparison between the proposed 
compromise graph and the attacker methodology 
described by Scambray and McClure [10]. It shows 
how the compromise graph models an attack 
progression in a manner that is similar to the attacker 
perspective. Compromise graphs are scalable to very 
large networks because the number of graph nodes is a 
linear function of number of machines in the network. 
The creation of compromise graphs should take 
into account cases where there are multiple machines 
of the same type. Consider a group of machines with 
identical configurations on the same LAN. The group 
represents a machine-type and should be treated as a 
single entity because each has exactly the same set of 
vulnerabilities. 
 
3.9. Step 9. Do steps 4-8 for baseline and 
enhanced System 
 
The identification of vulnerabilities and the 
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estimation of dominant attack paths should be done 
for both the baseline and enhanced systems to provide 
a basis for comparison. If the enhanced system has 
fewer vulnerabilities than the baseline system and if 
the dominant attack paths for the enhanced system 
have larger expected times-to-compromise than the 
baseline system, for every attacker skill level, then 
risk reduction can be estimated. 
 
3.10. Step 10. Estimate risk reduction 
 
We propose to use estimated time-to-compromise 
as the primary measure of system security and 
therefore risk. Other researchers have suggested the 
use of time as a security metric. For example, Dacier 
et al. [4] observed that for some kinds of attacks 
security increases as the time required for the success 
of the attack increases" and also suggested that most 
attacks could be characterized by "time" and "effort" 
metrics. Time-to-compromise is a measure of the 
effort expended by an attacker for a successful attack 
assuming effort is expended uniformly. It is not 
known how an increase in the time-to-compromise 
impacts an attacker; therefore, this is not a precise 
measurement of risk. However, we believe that as the 
time-to-compromise is increased, the likelihood of 
successful attack, and therefore risk, tends to decrease. 
We make the assumption that risk is inversely 
proportional to time-to-compromise because it is 
consistent with the view expressed above and because 
it leads to the following simple formulation for risk 
reduction. 
Pnew = Pold * (Oldtime/Newtime)   
where 
Pnew is the probability of a successful attack in the 
enhanced system, 
Pold is the probability of a successful attack in the 
baseline system, 
Oldtime is the expected time-to-compromise for 
the dominant attack path of the baseline system, 
Newtime is the expected time-to-compromise for 
the dominant attack path of the enhanced system,  
Risk reduction can be defined as ǻR = 1 – 
(Pnew/Pold) = 1 – (Oldtime/Newtime). 
 
The relationship between relative risk and relative 
time-to-compromise as defined above is plotted in 
Figure 2. As expected, the risk reduction approaches 
100% as the expected relative time-to-compromise 
increases. 
 Total time-to-compromise has variable and fixed 
components. The fixed component is the portion of 
the dominant attack path that is the same for the 
baseline and enhanced systems. The time for 
‘reconnaissance’ and ‘damage’ may be fixed costs as 
assumed for this case study. If the fixed costs are a 
significant portion of the total costs of the baseline 
system, risk reduction is limited accordingly. 
Therefore, the analysis separates the effects of fixed 
vs. variable costs. 
 
4. Case study results 
 
The proposed methodology was applied to a small 
SCADA system (CS60) consisting of 8 generic 
machine types connected to a local Ethernet LAN as 
shown in Figure 3. The attack target device with the 
highest potential for damage was identified as the 
RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) because it controls the 
physical state of equipment in the field. The security 
requirements for the CS60 system established the 
RTUs as the primary targets. The primary targets can 
be compromised by unauthorized RTU messages or 
by denying the normal flow of messages to and from 
the RTUs.  
The system was tested as delivered from the 
manufacturer and did not include a firewall. The only 
perimeter device for the CS60 is the Ethernet switch 
that connects the system to the internet. For the 
purposes of testing, this perimeter device was assumed 
to be a simple switch that prevents locally addressed 
packets from external observation and prevents 
flooding of the local network from external sources. 
There are often additional perimeter devices 
associated with operational SCADA systems; for 
example: the ICCP server may have a separate 
dedicated external network link, and the serial link to 
the RTUs could be used as an attack entry point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Estimated risk reduction versus time-to-
compromise ratio. 
Newtime / oldtime
¨R
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2006
7
However, the testing of the CS60 system did not 
include any additional perimeter devices, so they were 
not included in the analysis. 
The values of the "Reconnaissance" and "Damage" 
edges are expected to be unaffected by the security 
enhancements that were applied in our case study, 
therefore the values are considered to be "fixed costs". 
The time-to-compromise for reconnaissance was 
estimated to be 1 day for all attacker levels. Since 
many tools for reconnaissance are freely available and 
Figure 5. Estimated compromise time for 
RTU-control attack. 
Figure 3. Case study SCADA system (CS60)
Figure 4. Estimated compromise time for 
denial of service attack. 
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easy to use we believe the time needed for 
reconnaissance for our case study system should be a 
small number in most cases. The time-to-compromise 
from root permissions to Denial of Service was 
estimated to be 1 day for all attacker levels because 
Denial of Service is considered to be a well known 
exploit that requires no special knowledge of the 
control system and is therefore expected to be a small 
number. The time-to-compromise from root 
permissions to RTU_CONTROL was estimated to be 
2 days for expert, 10 days for intermediate skill, 60 
days for beginner, and 90 days for novice skill level. 
These numbers are based on a recent research project 
at INL researchers who developed exploits of a 
similar type. 
The total time-to-compromise was estimated for 
the baseline and enhanced versions of CS60 for each 
attacker skill level as described in sections 3.6 through 
3.8. Total time-to-compromise is the value of the 
dominant attack path, and for the CS60 system it is the 
sum of the fixed costs plus the time-to-compromise 
the most vulnerable machine (APPS1). The shortest 
path example shown in Figure 1 is the dominant path 
for the case of an expert attacker and 
RTU_CONTROL target for the baseline system. The 
dominant attack paths were in every case determined 
by the maximum number of vulnerabilities per 
machine; 19 vulnerabilities in the baseline system and 
11 vulnerabilities in the enhanced system. Estimated 
compromise time for a Denial of Service attack is 
shown in Figure 4 and for an RTU-Control attack in 
Figure 5.  
Risk reduction was estimated as described in 
section 3.10 using the estimated time- to-compromise 
values of the dominant attack path for the baseline 
(old) enhanced (new) CS60 system. Risk reduction 
estimates are shown in Figures 6 and 7. Denial of 
Service attack risk reduction estimates range from 
11.4 to 29.1%. For an RTU_CONTROL attack, risk 
reduction estimates range from 2.6 to 13.9%. Fixed 
costs are shown separately to emphasize how they 
affect the results. The fixed costs are the portion of the 
attack paths that were unaffected by the enhancements 
of the CS60 system and are the sum of the 
reconnaissance and damage parts of the attack paths, 
which were chosen somewhat arbitrarily. The 
estimated risk reduction is very small for the cases 
where the fixed cost is a significant portion of the 
baseline total time-to-compromise. Also, the absolute 
value of time-to-compromise is much lower for expert 
attackers than for novice attackers, even though the % 
change is not a strong function of the attacker type. 
 
5. Alternative simplistic risk reduction 
models/metrics 
 
Consider some simplistic alternative quantitative 
risk reduction models/metrics. One such model is the 
binary open/closed door model in which any known 
vulnerability is considered an open door that a 
determined attacker will eventually enter. The 
application of this model to the case study yields a 
risk reduction of zero because there are known 
vulnerabilities (open doors) remaining that lead to a 
successful attack, even though many doors have been 
closed. This model has some merit, particularly if the 
attacker is highly skilled and is determined to attack 
that particular site, but is considered too pessimistic 
and too simplistic because it does not take into 
account the various types of potential attackers, the 
difficulty associated with the exploitation of existing 
Figure 6. Estimated risk reduction for denial of 
service attack 
FFigure 7. Estimated risk reduction for RTU-control 
attack. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Novice Beginner Intermediate Expert
Attacker Skill Level
%
 
ris
k 
re
du
ct
io
n
total variable component
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Novice Beginner Intermediate Expert
Attacker Skill Level
%
 
ris
k 
re
du
ct
io
n
total variable component
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2006
9
vulnerabilities, or the time required to complete a 
successful attack. 
Another alternative quantitative risk reduction 
metric may be obtained by counting the reduction in 
number of vulnerabilities. This can be done in several 
ways. For example: the total number of vulnerabilities 
(before and after system enhancements) associated 
with all the machines in the system, or the number 
associated with the most vulnerable machine may be 
counted. An alternative view of vulnerabilities is the 
number of open TCP services rather than CVE entries. 
For this case study, the total holes found by Nessus 
(http://www.nessus.org) was reduced from 154 to 21 
(86%), the number of vulnerabilities on the most 
vulnerable machine was reduced from 19 to 11 (42%), 
and the total number of open TCP services was 
reduced from 298 to 95 (68%). This model is also 
believed to be too simplistic and too optimistic 
because it implies a linear relationship between 
number of vulnerabilities and risk, and ignores other 
important considerations such as type of attacker and 
exploit difficulty. Also, a metric that uses total 
vulnerabilities does not take into account the multiple 
potential paths of an attack. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We proposed a methodology for obtaining a 
quantitative measurement of the risk reduction 
achieved when a control system is modified with the 
intent to improve cyber security defense against 
external attackers. The methodology employs a 
directed graph called a compromise graph, where the 
nodes represent stages of a potential attack and edges 
represent the expected time-to-compromise for several 
attacker skill levels. As part of the methodology, time-
to-compromise was modeled as a function of known 
vulnerabilities and attacker skill level and the 
methodology was applied to calculate risk reduction 
estimates for a specific SCADA system and for a 
specific set of control system security remedial 
measures.  
The nature of the numerical results obtained show 
that risk is related to system attributes in ways 
consistent with intuition, and reinforces the types of 
remedial actions that truly reduce risk. For example, 
the model emphasizes the dynamic nature of cyber 
security such that risk increases over time, unless 
there is constant effort to install patches or disable 
services as soon as new vulnerabilities are discovered. 
The model suggests the need to harden the weakest 
link in the attack path, but also emphasizes the need to 
harden many pathways because of the many potentials 
paths that could become the weakest link. The model 
suggests the importance of a firewall to reduce the 
number of vulnerabilities exploitable externally and 
suggests the security value of network partitioning 
within the control system to reduce the number of 
potential attack paths. The model also suggests the 
value of an intrusion detection mechanism so that 
remedial action can thwart an attack if it is detected in 
time. 
The risk analysis model has the following 
drawbacks. The mapping of time to risk does not 
account for the intensity of the attacker. The model 
does not currently take into account dependencies 
between vulnerabilities on different machines, unless 
the machines are identical. For example, if two 
machines are not identical but have some of the same 
vulnerabilities, compromising them are not 
independent events. Also, it implies that, after 
reconnaissance, the attacker has a complete view of 
the system, but a more realistic attack model may have 
multiple reconnaissance activities.  
The proposed methodology provides a uniform 
assessment mechanism that can be applied to the 
evaluation of security measures in other control 
systems. It provides a quantitative assessment of 
relative time for an attacker to generate an undesired 
consequence. The model provides risk estimation 
differentiation among several attacker skill levels and 
provides a framework for discussion. The level of 
abstraction is high enough to be manageable and 
detailed enough to provide useful security and 
defensive information. We believe that this 
methodology is extensible and can be useful for 
guiding risk assessments and mitigation strategies. 
 
7. Future Work 
 
The kind of data needed to effectively estimate 
control system cyber security risk is currently 
unavailable. For example: the industry needs a 
vulnerability library specific to control systems similar 
to the existing IT CVE vulnerability library. The 
existing CVE libraries do not always clearly identify 
the conditions under which a given vulnerability 
applies, nor do they indicate how difficult it is to 
exploit a given vulnerability. Existing vulnerability 
scanning tools do not clearly identify which 
vulnerabilities are tested and which are not. We would 
like to run experiments that measure the statistics 
associated with Processes 1 and 2. Validated 
statistical models may allow for a measure of the error 
bounds associated with future risk reduction estimates. 
We would like to extend the compromise graph 
model to account for dependencies between 
vulnerabilities on different machines and include 
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2006
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multiple reconnaissance steps such that the path taken 
is the easiest node currently visible to the attacker. 
This will require establishing a method for estimating 
the damage and reconnaissance type edges of the 
compromise graphs and investigating how other 
parameters, besides attacker skill level and number of 
vulnerabilities, affect the compromise time of the 
edges. It may be valuable to match exploits to 
vulnerabilities and assess the difficulty in 
using/tweaking the exploit, but this may change too 
rapidly to be useful.  
We suggest developing a tool to speed the 
development of user risk analysis models. The ideal 
tool would be useable by owner operators, so it needs 
to be intuitive and the components used to specify the 
system must map well to the users conception of the 
system. The underlying analytic engine would then 
transform the user specified model into the underlying 
analytic model. With future development, the model 
may be used for aiding secure system design and 
security requirements by providing better methods of 
measuring the potential risk reduction associated with 
design alternatives. 
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